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Abstract
This paper assesses an economy's default risk on its international
debt by considering different approaches, prevalent in the literature.
Unlike in multi-country studies, these data comprise reported loans to
one economy only- This is useful since the country's macroeconomic
development is the common factor in all observations. The study
suggests that for Israeli data the traditional approach, stressing an
economy's ability to repay the external debt, performed better than the
more recent approach emphasizing the borrowing country's costs and
benefits from default, reflecting Its willingness to repay debt. Policy
considerations conclude the study.
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Summary
This paper analyzes Israel's creditworthiness in the years 1971-83
in light of the recent literature on this subject. One approach views
the default (or rescheduling) on a country's external debt as a choice
of the borrower, who acts rationally by weighing the costs and benefits
of debt repudiation. The other approach, referred to in the paper as
the debt-service capacity approach, perceives default as the culmination
of an unintended deterioration in the borrower's capacity to service his
debt. The paper suggests that this distinction implies different sets of
explanatory variables, depending on the favored view of the determinants
of default risk. The sets differ with respect not only to the relevant
variables included, but also to specific variables. It is frequently
argued that specific variables, said to be relevant in both approaches,
actually have opposite effects on creditworthiness.
The data used here refer to dollar loans received by Israeli private
and public borrowers from foreign commercial banks. Though a number of
studies have used pooled data on loans from the international banking
system, this study uses pooled data on a single economy. This eliminates
the possible weakness of cross-sectional data on different countries,
arising from definitional problems and the uneven quality of the data
across countries, as well as other problems, such as country-specific
institutional differences.
The study suggests that for the observed Israeli data the traditional
approach, stressing the capacity of an economy to repay the external debt,
performed better than the more recent approach that emphasizes the borrow-
ing country's costs and benefits from default, reflecting the debtor's
willingness to repay debt.
The paper concludes by suggesting two policy considerations. First,
since bankers appear to evaluate macroeconomic developments by their
impact on debt-service capacity rather than on the borrower's costs and
benefits from debt repudiation, the major issue facing the borrowing
country is that of monitoring its debt-service capacity. Second, in
view of the importance of reserves as a determinant of creditworthiness,
a debtor country may consider borrowing for the sake of reserve accumula-
tion or reserve pegging.
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I. Introduction
This paper analyzes Israel's creditworthiness in the years 1971 to
1983 in light of the recent literature on this subject. One approach
views the default (or rescheduling) on a country's external debt as a
choice situation of the borrower, who acts rationally by weighing costs
and benefits from debt repudiation (henceforth CBA). The other,
referred to here as the debt-service capacity approach (DSCA),
apprehends default as the culmination of an unintended deterioration in
the borrower's capacity to service his debt. We suggest that this
distinction implies different sets of explanatory variables, depending
on the favored view on the determinants of default risk. The sets
differ not only with respect to the relevant variables included; but
also specific variables, which are said to be relevant in both views,
are frequently argued to have opposite effects on creditworthiness.
The data used here refer to dollar-loans received by Israeli
private and public borrowers from foreign commercial banks. Though a
number of studies have used pooled data on loans from the international
banking system, this study uses pooled data on a single economy. This
eliminates possible weaknesses of cross-sectional data on different
countries, arising from definitional problems, varying quality of the
data across countries, as well as other problems such as country-
specific institutional differences.
Our empirical findings suggest that the DSCA peforms well, while
the CBA, which emphasizes the debtor's willingness, rather than his
ability to repay his debt does not fit the Israeli data. The set of
explanatory variables is divided into three distinct groups. The first
two consist of variables, common to both approaches. However, while the
variables of the first subset affect default probability in the same
direction according to both views, the second subset, consists of
variables with opposite effects. The third subset includes those
variables which are unique to either of the two approaches. The
empirical evidence suggests that the DSCA performs better in each of the
three subsets•
After discussing the different approaches in the next section, the
empirical results are reported in Section 4. Possible uses of the
results for purposes of debt-management policy are addressed in section
5. The model underlying the reduced form equation is described in
Appendix I. Definitions and data sources are given in Appendix II.
Further regressions are reported in Appendix III.
II. Cost-Benefit Versus Debt-Service Capacity—
Two Competing Views
1. The cost-benefit approach
For many years the literature on optimal borrowing by national
economies on the one hand and the mostly empirical studies on default on
Download Date: 4/1/2005 - 10:05 AM User: RRAFOLS
Current Classification: Available to the Public
- 2 -
international debt on the other hand developed independently of each
other. Bardhan (1967), Hamada (1969), Bade (1972), Hanson (1974), and
others developed models using optimal control theory to derive optimal
paths of foreign debt accumulation. Practically all authors accounted
for the default problem either implicitly or explicitly by assuming a
loan supply schedule with a rising cost of foreign capital as a function
of debt size. Bardhan also allowed for disutility in the welfare
function, caused by foreign debt accumulation. Freeman (1979)
explicitly introduced benefits and costs from debt repudiation
(henceforth DR) by allowing the debtor to consider DR as a possible
strategy, including its timing. In this model the borrower permanently
compares a grand plan of investment-cum-default to one of investment-
cum-compliance. The "naive" lenders are assumed not to be aware of any
of this, since prior to the moment of default they are supposed to
supply any amount of debt at the level of the safe interest rate. The
debtor's capital cost is supposed to increase only after default has
occurred. The defaulting economy's benefit is the "windfall gain"
consisting of the outstanding debt, by which the country's equity
capital is assumed to increase. According to Freeman then, the higher a
borrower's long term growth intentions, the less likely is he to
repudiate the debt within the planning period, since in that case
consumption will be clustered more toward the end of the period and thus
discounted more heavily by the higher post-default rate of interest. In
reality the increase in the interest rate will probably not be of such
discontinuity, but rather endogenously determined by the lender's
expectations of default probability.
Eaton and Gersovitz (henceforth EG) (1981a) and (1981b) suggest
that in absence of legal institutions, able to enforce international
loan agreements, breached by sovereign governments, the market mechanism
emerges in form of a threat of future exclusion from international
capital markets. In the extreme case the cost of repudiation to the
defaulting debtor is the loss in welfare due to his being forced into
autarchy or at best barter in his foreign trade. The benefit resembles
that in Freeman, though EG (1981 a,b) do not restrict themselves to the
investment motive for foreign debt accumulation. According to EG
(1981b) the demand for external debt derives from four major motives,
namely the consumption, transactions, investment and adjustment
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motives. The higher the expected cost to the debtor due to intentional
repudiation, the lower is his incentive to default, the reverse being
true for the benefit from DR. 1/
According to the consumption motive of borrowing, an economy
wishing to pursue a steady consumption path, has a strong incentive to
secure free access to the foreign capital market. Thus the higher its
income variability, the lower will be the incentive of DR (see
proposition 4 in EG (1981a)). In this context an economy might wish to
increase present borrowing in order to enjoy already part of its future
income growth. Thus income growth should be positively related to the
cost of default. 2/
Regarding the transactions motive, the debtor's incentive to invest
in his "reputation".vis-a-vis the lender should be positively linked to
some measure of the economy's "openness" to foreign markets. Such an
indicator reflects the consumers' tastes for imported goods and
services, the sensitivity of production factor unemployment to the
steadiness of imports of raw materials, capital goods, spare parts, and
of export demand. A commonly used indicator for openness is the ratio
of imports to income. We use a measure of the volume of goods and
services imports and exports relative to GNP.
As to the investment motive, investment opportunities, promising
relatively high productivity in the borrowing country, are recognized as
an important argument for debt accumulation. Sachs and Cohen (1982)
show that in a two-period model with a constant penalty rate from debt
repudiation, triggered by a random shock on the second period's output,
lenders' credit ceilings will be positively related to the debtor's
investment propensity especially if he precommits himself to an
investment plan.
The adjustment motive is represented here by a measure of current
account variability, implying that a large part of it is due to external
1/ According to this view, both the transversality condition
(solvency constraint) and the liquidity constraint are assumed to hold
at least implicitly, because otherwise debt repudiation cannot be viewed
as a choice situation. The transversality condition is stated in Cooper
and Sachs (1984, p. 5). It assumes the principal and interest payment
on it to be smaller than the discounted sum of future trade balance
surpluses at any point in time. The liquidity constraint requires the
debt service, and other unavoidable expenditures in each period to be
smaller than total foreign exchange receipts.
2/ EG (1981a) show that this growth effect might be ambiguous,
depending on the elasticity of the marginal utility of income, since a
high growth rate increases the extent to which future penalties are
discounted.
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shocks affecting imports and exports, thus creating an incentive to
secure future borrowing. Concluding this discussion we suggest that the
following specification duly represents the cost benefit approach.
(1) TT = TT($, R, g , o , open, dmpk, agg)
where D = external debt, R = reserves, g = growth rate of GNP,
a = variance of GNP from trend, open = (imports + exports)/GNP, mpk =
marginal product of capital, a = variance of the balance on goods and
services from trend. The signs^above the variables indicate first
derivatives.
2. The debt-service capacity approach
This approach excludes the possibility of a debtor country
willingly repudiating its debt. Accordingly default is due to an
unforeseen economic development which creates an unsustainable situation
manifesting itself either in short-term illiquidity or in a long run
problem of the country's economic structure, which eventually ends up in
liquidity problems. While the CBA and the literature on optimal debt
assume that the debtor's intertemporal budget constraint, which sets a
limit to his borrowing facilities, is satisfied, the DSCA deals with its
violation, e.g., due to economic mismanagement, unanticipated external
shocks or long run structural problems• Conceptually, then, the
underlying assumptions of the DSCA and the CBA are mutually exclusive
for a debtor country in a given period of time.
In the 1970s there were many studies which improved the more
rudimentary growth-cum-debt approach outlined in Avromovic (1964) by the
use of more sophisticated statistical procedures. The basic aim of this
sort of study is to find empirical regularities, by the help of which
debt-servicing problems can be predicted. Frank and Cline (1971), Feder
and Just (1977a) and (1977b), Saini and Bates (1978), Mayo and Barrett
(1978), Sargen (1976) and (1977), are but a few of several such
studies. The relevant variables are typically chosen ad hoc. Table 1
lists the hypothesized signs of the most commonly represented
variables. The letters in parentheses, given next to the sign,
indicates if that effect was found to be statistically insignificant (i)
or opposite (o) to the hypothesized sign.
The probability of a sudden liquidity crisis diminishes with a
higher current GNP, a lower ratio of imports to reserves or GNP and with
a lower debt service in percent of exports. Long run solvency is
supposed to improve with growth in exports and in output. Furthermore
long run solvency is anticipated to improve with increased investment
opportunities and a falling debt/output ratio. According to many
studies of this type, an economy's ability to adjust to external shocks
also deteriorates with increasing export variability, by causing
irregularity in foreign exchange receipts. The inflation rate or money
supply growth reflect more general indicators of lenders' confidence in
the ability of economic management by the borrowing country's
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authorities. Average debt maturity is somewhat ambiguous, since on the
one hand, a Long debt maturity ascertains low periodical amortization
payments, thus improving creditworthiness in the long run, but on the
other hand, creates more rigidity of this flow, since there is not much
possibility left for reducing amortization payments by substituting
short maturities for longer ones in the short run.
A few remarks to Table 1. Angeloni and Brock (1980): Our table
includes only their first four equations (see there, Table 1), since the
others include a direct measure of default probability, from a regular
survey by the "Institutional Investor," on the right hand side of the
equation in additon to the other explanatory variables.
Feder and Just (1977a) (henceforth FJ) argue, similarly to Frank
and Cline (1971), that a higher average debt maturity worsens
creditworthiness because debt service cannot be alleviated in the short
run by an immediate reduction in borrowing. Additionally to the
conventional one, they also use a modified debt-service ratio, including
all foreign exchange earnings rather than only exports* This variable
was found significant. They performed a Logit-analysis on a binary
variable of defaulting versus nondefaulting countries. In their (1977b)
article, they use regression analysis on interest rates on Eurocurrency
loans.
Saini and Bates (1978) introduced three additional variables to the
standard list. (1) the current account balance minus the change in
reserves, (2) this variable's integral over five years, and (3) net
foreign assets of the banking system divided by the money supply. They
compare the results from discriminant analysis (as in Frank and Cline)
and logit analysis on the mentioned binary variable.
A comprehensive survey of this literature can be found in McDonald
(1982). These studies' main disadvantage compared to the Cost Benefit
approach lies in their ad hoc selection of variables indicating future
default problems and in their lack of theoretical underpinnings.
Kharas' work (1981) is an exception to this criticism. He outlined a
macroeconomic growth model of a Harrod-Domar type, in which
creditworthiness is derived as a function of the actual capital stock's
deviation from the critical capital stock, the latter being defined as
that level, which is sufficient to maintain creditworthiness at a given
level of expected gross capital inflows and existing outstanding debt.
Here the marginal propensity to invest out of net foreign capital
inflows may have an ambiguous effect on creditworthiness since such
foreign investment not only increases the capital stock, but also causes
debt service to rise. In this approach a lengthening of average debt
maturity unambiguously improves creditworthiness, contrarily to other
studies, such as Frank and Cline (1971), Angeloni and Short (1980) and
Edwards (1984).
Summarizing the various studies, we then suggest the following
general specification to represent the DSCA:
Download Date: 4/1/2005 - 10:05 AM User: RRAFOLS
Current Classification: Available to the Public
- 6 -
(2) TT = 7r(5, R, open, a+ , KPC, GNP, CPI, DSR^TIO, DTERM)
gs
where the additional variables to those in (1) are KPC = per capita
capital stocks, GNP = current GNP, CPI = consumer price inflation,
DSRATIO = debt-service ratio, DTERM = average debt maturity,
3. Comparison of the two approaches
The discussed approaches differ in two important respects. Namely,
in their variable selection and in their signs of the partial
derivatives on default probability. These differences are summarized in
Table 2.
The variables can be divided into three groups. The first contains
variables with the same specification with regard to their signs (though
differing in their rationale). This group includes the external debt
and reserves or indicators of investment opportunities (MPK). The
second group, though consisting of similar variables, leads to opposite
hypothesized effects on creditworthiness, such as for example openness
and export variance. The last group includes all the variables which
appear in only one of the specifications, such as the inflation rate,
the debt service ratio, GNP, etc. In some instances, this distinction
is not clear cut. For example, one may argue, that income growth and
export growth may, in some cases, be proxies for each other.
Noncompressible imports or the debt-service ratio may also have some
bearing on the Cost Benefit Approach (though with opposite sign). It is
however maintained here, that considering the distinct rationale and
emphasis in the literature, underlying the specific variables, the
suggested partition in Table 2 reflects these differences adequately. 1/
4. Empirical results
The technical issues and assumptions underlying the derivation of
sovereign risk from data on interest rate differentials are discussed in
Appendix I. This section compares the performance of the specifications
derived from the two approaches.
The regressed data include all Israeli private and public sector
floating-rate dollar loans received from foreign banks, as reported to
1/ The signs in parentheses in Table 2 indicate that the direction of
the sign is consistent with the spirit of the approach without having
necessarily been applied precisely in this form in the mentioned
empirical studies.
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the Foreign Exchange Controller at the Bank of Israel over the years
1971 to 1983. 1/ The data presented here are unique among comparable
studies in several respects. To our knowledge it is the first
application to concentrate on the loans to a single country. Thus
problems of differing definitions and quality of macroeconomic variables
among different countries are avoided. Here these variables are by
definition common to all the observations. Furthermore the analyzed
data are nearly identical to the total population of this specific type
of loans, rather than being a small sample of it.
Out of 524 bank loans received during those 13 years, some
70 percent were on a floating rate basis, mostly from the Eurodollar
market. Only 19 contracts were linked to the U.S. prime rate. The
Government was the principal borrower over this period with over
80 percent of the floating rate loans. Table 3 summarizes a few
facts. Maturities and grace period were usually shorter and spreads
usually higher on floating rate loans than on fixed rate loans. This is
especially apparent in the summary figures for all years. In other
words, the floating rate loans are on average less favorable than the
fixed rate loans. It should be emphasized here, that these loans
constitute only a small fraction (2.5 percent in December 1983) of the
total gross external debt of Israel, most of which is borrowed at much
better terms• However, it does represent the marginal cost of foreign
capital to the Israeli economy, relevant for public policy on the
foreign debt. Public project appraisal has to account for it even if
the specific project is financed by cheaper foreign loans, since this
may in itself push other projects to the margin. The dependent variable
(r) is calculated as in equation (1A), i.e., as the spread in percentage
of the safe rate of interest on the day of contract. The safe rate is
defined as the LIBOR for Eurodollar loans and as the PRIME rate for
loans from the U.S. capital market. Due to severe discrepancies in the
quality of the calculated spreads on fixed rate loans, as compared to
reported spreads of the floating rate loans, empirical tests were
performed on the latter only, since these data are much more
homogeneous.
Several experiments were made to extract the appropriate time lag
concerning the macroeconomic information reaching the lending bank's
decision makers. We tested four possible lags, namely, one quarter,
1/ Several remarks are necessary: Foreign banks do not include
subsidiaries of the Israeli banking system abroad. It would have been
preferable to include also loans received at a fixed interest rate,
however, there is a significant difference in the quality of the data.
While on the floating rate loans the spread itself is recorded, this is
not the case for the fixed rate loans. Our approximation of the spread
on the latter loans clearly indicated that the safe rate of interest (to
be deducted from the actual rate) was not precise enough, since even
small daily or hourly changes influence the calculated spread
not noticeably.
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half a year, three quarters of a year and one year. The best results
were achieved by applying a lag of three quarters of a year (see Table
8, Appendix III). 1/ The typical regression equation can be written
K L
(3) ln(r ) = a + Z a x + Z B Z + u
nt o k=l k kT 1=1 1 nit nt
where n are the individual loans in a given year, and t is a daily time
index. 2/ Loan-specific variables, such as the maturity of the loan,
its size and grace period are denoted by Zj, 1 = 1....L. Macroeconomic
variables are denoted by xfc, k = 1....K. The reference year at time t,
(due to the assumed lag) is denoted by T, T = 1970 to 1983. All the
variables are defined in Appendix II.
The main regression results are reported in Table 4. In order to
facilitate the interpretation of the regressions, a more general
description of the variables is given in brackets.
The major conclusion is that the Israeli data for the observed
period favor the debt-service-capacity approach in explaining observed
spreads. This conclusion is drawn from the following results: (1) The
variables (RPCD, RPCR) are strongly significant in the hypothesized
direction according to both views on creditworthiness, thus their
inclusion is crucial, though it does not provide further information on
the relative strength of either approach. (2) The estimated
coefficients of the variables, common to both approaches, but having
opposite a priori signs, are consistent with the DSCA (OPEN, VGS). (3)
The subset of variables, unique to each approach indicates that those
added in the DSCA confirm the hypothesis. This includes the real per
capita stock of capital (KPC), current GNP per capita (DGNPPC), the
debt-service ratio (DSRATIO), and the inflation rate (CPI). On the
Other hand, the variance (VRGNP) and growth rate of GNP (GRPCY), which
reflect the consumption motive discussed earlier and are typical for the
CBA, appear with the wrong sign, and more so the coefficient of the
variance (VRGNP) could be interpreted as supporting the DSCA, though
this variable is not usually referred to in the mentioned studies. The
marginal product of capital (MPK) is consistent with the CBA hypothesis,
though its negative sign does not contradict the intuition of the DSCA,
1/ Such a reference period is introduced as following: Any loan
granted in the first three quarters of the year is assumed to have been
contracted upon the information on macroeconomic developments up to the
end of the preceding year. Only in the last quarter is the lender
assumed to know the data of the present year.
2/ As can be seen from Table 3, their numbers differ over time, which
means that the data are not pooled in the usual sense. However, this is
common to all the studies of combined cross-section and time series data
mentioned above•
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The interpretation of the constant has an interesting aspect.
Besides the elasticity term (given monopolistic competition between
lenders), it perhaps also contains a more basic notion of "moral
commitment to debt repayment" which is only the constant part of
creditworthiness. It can be interpreted as reflecting the lender's
judgement of the borrower's basic disposition to repay debts in general,
notwithstanding the economic environment. There is no doubt, that this
basic readiness differs among borrowing countries. In equation (3) the
intercept can be written
where u denotes the demand elasticity 1/ with respect to changes in the
spread, and a* reflects the borrower's reputation of repayment•
Unfortunately, the elasticity term remains unidentified. An
absolute demand elasticity (u) of zero implies a = a*, whereas an
infinite u corresponds to the term in brackets approaching 1
asymptotically from above etc.
Table 5 reports on the regression results obtained from estimating
(3) according to the DSCA (equation (2)). In the logarithmic case the
intercept is not significantly different from zero. Adding for example
the assumption of u = 1.25, this implies a negative value for
a* = -5 . The economic interpretation is possibly that Israel's record
as a conscientious debtor acts as a risk-reducing factor on the lenders'
perception of Israel's creditworthiness.
Another interesting conclusion from the empirical results is that
most variables determining the spread are linked more to the bankers'
percept ion of short-run liquidity than long run solvency. This is
indicated by the fact that most of the relevant macroeconomic variables
address the liquidity problem, such as for example, the debt-service
ratio (DSRATIO), 2/ current nominal per capita income (in dollars) and
real per capita reserve holdings (RPCR). 3_/ Real per capita debt and
capital stock bear more information on the solvency aspect. The fact,
that the reserve coefficient is approximately four times as large as the
debt-coefficient (the variables are of equal denomination), confirms
this observation. Of course, one should not conclude that "solvency"
1/ This is discussed in FJ (1977b) on page 26.
2/ It may be argued that the common debt service ratio does not
properly represent the Israeli case, because of the sizeable and steady
flow of transfer payments from the U.S. Government and the private
sector. Adding these to the export earnings hardly affects the results
(Table 6, R5).
3/ Following Dornbusch (1983), debt and reserves are first translated
into the domestic currency at the official exchange rate and then
deflated by the domestic consumer price index.
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problems do not matter, but rather that the supply of loans as such is
conditional upon a basically sound economy in the borrowing country and
the risk factor is then largely determined by the liquidity position.
Put differently, a bank would probably stop lending altogether, if long
run solvency was seriously endangered, but on the other hand liquidity
problems may well develop on the background of a perfectly healthy
solvency situation. Such an example is described in Cooper and Sachs
(1984, p. 8-11).
Furthermore, the spread on a particular loan is certainly
influenced by the specific risk of a given firm or institution,
separately from the sovereign risk which is common to all the loans.
Unfortunately on the former risk, no information is available. The fact
that the explanatory power hardly reaches 0.60 is probably due to this
source of variation. The dummy variable PUBLIC, which indicates whether
the loan has been taken by the Government or one of the semi-
governmental agencies on the one hand, or by the private sector on the
other hand, shows that the risk factor associated with the public sector
is significantly below that of the private sector. Furthermore, the
loans received in the Euromarket clearly bear a higher risk premium than
those taken in the U.S. capital market. As reported in Table 6, (R6 to
R8) the specific loan's maturity (TERM) and loan size (SUM) are
statistically insignificant, whereas the grace period seems to increase
risk. Admittedly, the use of the these loan-specific variables assumes
that they are predetermined.
Instead of the real per capita stock of capital (KPC), we also
tried the long run growth trend of exports (GEXP), and alternatively a
measure which takes consumption rigidities into account (DSR1). Each
one enters the regression satisfactorily, though they alter the other
variables significance without affecting R by much. This may be due to
multicollinearity (Rl, R4). Substituting the marginal propensity to
invest (MPI) for KPC did not improve the regression results compared to
Table 4 (R2). As mentioned earlier, the effect of the average maturity
of the total debt is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand Kharas,
focusing mainly on solvency problems, attributes an improvement of
creditworthiness to longer maturities (DTERM) and on the other hand in
the other empirical articles, a predominantly long term debt affects
creditworthiness negatively, due to the short term rigidity, created by
such precommitments• Our evidence (R3) supports the latter
interpretation. This further confirms the impression, that risk premia
reflect liquidity problems more strongly than solvency considerations.
Another problem discussed in FJ (1977b) and also in Edwards (1984)
is that of time specific effects. Such effects might exist due to
differing market conditions over time. Recalling our previous
discussion, monopolistic competition among bankers implies a demand-
elasticity term in the intercept as in expression (4) Changing market
conditions, such as for example sudden large inflows of Petrodollars
into the Euromarket, may be approximated by introducing time dummies
provided the demand elasticity remain constant. Having assumed an
Download Date: 4/1/2005-10:05 AM User: RRAFOLS
Current Classification: Available to the Public
- 11 -
information lag of less than one year, this renders our equation just
identifiable for most of the lags, despite the fact that the
macroeconomic variables are common to all borrowers at a given point in
time. Separate time dummies for each year and a trend variable were
found to be statistically insignificant. A more selective choice of the
years 1973 and 1976 and a period dummy for the years 1980 to 1983
yielded better results. From Appendix III, Table 9, it can be seen,
that the year 1973 with the Yom-Kippur war and the oil crisis added
significantly to the risk factor. The period dummy for the early 1980s
also adds to the risk premium, a fact which may be linked to the general
LDC-debt crisis, which took place approximately in this period.
5. Some policy issues
The results of this paper can be applied in several ways. First a
creditworthiness-index (c) can be derived, which is based on the
bankers' sovereign-risk evaluation, as revealed in the interest
spread. Such a measure can be usefully applied as a minimum constraint
on macroeconomic planning by the debtor country. Second, the estimated
regression coefficients allow us to evaluate the effect of certain
policies on the marginal cost of foreign capital and on
creditworthiness.
Using function (2A) of Appendix I, we calculate fr(x) or
alternatively c(x) = [1 - TT(X)] from the regression in Table 5. The
level of default probability varies with our assumption on the absolute
value of the demand elasticity as discussed above. As illustrated in
Table 7 the lower the demand elasticity, the lower is the level of
default probability (IT). Given this identification problem of the
intercept, the changes in creditworthiness are more reliable than the
absolute levels. 1/
III. Conclusions
The empirical evidence presented here supports the view that
bankers evaluate macroeconomic developments by their impact on debt
service capacity rather than on the borrower's costs and benefits from
debt repudiation. Consequently, the major issue facing the borrowing
country is that of monitoring its debt service capacity. In other
words, macroeconomic policy decisions have to be taken in consideration
of their effect on the country's short run liquidity and long run
solvency constraints. One possibility is to define critical values for
c or its time path, which can be calculated using the estimated
coefficients of regressions like that appearing in Table 5.
_1/ This illustrates a major difficulty in comparing creditworthiness
indices among different countries, since the index level is very
sensitive to the assumption concerning the demand elasticity, which is
unidentified•
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In view of the importance of reserves as a determinant of
creditworthiness, a debtor country may for instance consider borrowing
for the sake of reserve accumulation or reserve-pegging (Edwards,
1984). For this purpose we take the total differential of the reduced
form (3) (using the estimated coefficients from Table 5). Since gross
debt and reserves enter the regression in real per capita terms, we
allow for an equal change in gross debt and foreign exchange reserves.
A US$100 million loan taken by the Government at a rate of, say,
0.25 percent over the U.S.-prime rate, changes the predicted value of
ln(r) by
Aln(r) = 0.14 (RPCD) - 0.38 (RPCR) - 0.11 (DSRATIO)
Given our earlier assumption of U = 5 , such a policy improves
creditworthiness from 97.5 to 98.1 for the year 1983.
This exercise hinges on the assumption, that such reserve pegging
is transitory and of moderate size, since otherwise the model parameters
will not necessarily remain stable. As mentioned earlier, this
improvement in creditworthiness is probably due ot a stronger impact of
liquidity aspects on the spread as compared to solvency aspects, the
latter affecting the quantity more strongly than the costs of borrowing.
Although the period since 1983 has not been studied here, the
present results would suggest an improvement in creditworthiness, due to
the sharp fall in the rate of inflation immediately following the
stabilization program of 1985 and to the replenishment of foreign
exchange reserves since then.
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Table 1. Determinants of Creditworthiness
(Signs indicate 6TT / 6x )
Angeloni
Explanatory and Short
Variables (1980)
GNP
GDP growth
Export growth
Export variance
Debt service/
exports +
Imports/Reserves +
Imports/GNP
Debt/GNP +
Average debt
maturity
Inflation or money
supply growth
Feder and
Just
(1977a)
-(i)
-
-
Ho)
+
+
+ (o)
+
Feder and
Just
(1977b)
-(i)
+
+
+
+
+ (i)
+ (i)
Frank and
Cline
(1971)
-(i,o)
-(i)
+(i,o)
+
+
+(i,o)
Saini and
Bates
(1978)
-(i)
-(i)
+(i,o)
+
+(i,o)
+
Sargen
(1976)
+
+
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Table 2. Comparison between the two Approaches
Variable (Sign indicates STT/6X)
CBA DSCA
Debt + +
Reserves (e.g., reserves/GNP)
Openness (e.g., imports/GNP) - +
Variance of exports (goods and services) - +
Growth of income - (-)
Variance of income - (+)
Capital stock per capita -
Marginal productivity of capital - (-)
Imports/reserves (reserve adequacy) +
GNP
Inflation rate, money supply growth +
Debt-service ratio (+) +
Noncompressible imports (-) +
Average debt maturity + 1/
1/ Conceivably ambiguous (see above discussion).
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Table 4. Israel: Comparison of the Performance of CBA and DSCA 1/
Dependent Variable:r
Explanatory Variables: CBA
Estimates
DSCA
Intercept
RPCD (real debt per capita)
RPCR (real reserves per capita)
OPEN (openness)
VGS (variance of goods and services
exports)
MPK (marginal product of capital)
VRGNP (variance of real GNP)
GRPCY (growth of real GNP)
KPC (real capital stock per capita)
DGNPPC (GNP per capita)
DSRATIO (debt-service ratio)
CPI (inflation rate)
PUBLIC (dummy for public sector loans)
EURO (dummy for Euromarket loans)
-0.201
(-3.2)
0.017
(11.5)
-0.058
(-8.0)
0.157
(3.7)
4.4E-7
(1.4)
-0.085
(-9.4)
0.664
(5.4)
0.027
(8.8)
0.374
(3.0)
0.017
(6.7)
-0.055
(-6.3)
0.273
(4.0)
1.8E-6
(4.9)
-0.032
(-6.6)
0.033
(3.4)
-0.013
(-4.1)
-0.048
(-4.6)
0.011
(9.2)
4.7E-4
(3.9)
-0.031
(-6.4)
0.031
(3.2)
F - Value
Numbers of observations
0.586
55.59
363
0.593
51.18
363
1/ Figures in parentheses below the estimates are t-values.
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Table 6. Israel: Selected Regressions
Dependent Variable: r
Regressions:
Explanatory Variables:
Intercept
RPCD
RPCR
OPEN
VGS
KPC
DSR1
GEXP
MPI
DGNPPC
DSRATIO
DSTRATIO
DIERM
CPI
PUBLIC
EURO
TERM
GRACE
SUM
R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 R 5 R 6 R 7 R8
0.36 -0.10 -1 .36 -0.44 0.45 0.35 0.36 0.37
(3.5) (-1.6) (-3.3) (-5.3) (3.6) (2.7) (2.8) (3.0)
-7.0E-4 0.01 0.02 9.4E-4 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
(-0.3) (5.7) (7.3) (0.4) (5.1) (6.6) (6.5) (6.7)
-0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -6.7E-3 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(-3.8) (-2.0) (-4.8) (-0.8) (-6.2) (-6.2) (-5.9) (-6.3)
0.04 0.06 0.54 0.24 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.28
(1.2) (1.7) (6.0) (4.4) (2.1) (4.0) (3.9) (4.1)
9.3E-7 6.5E-7 1.5E-6 7.2E-7 1.6E-6 1.8E-6 1.8E-6 1.9E-6
(3.4) (2.2) (4.1) (2.4) (4.3) (4.9) (5.0) (5.0)
-0.01 -7.9E-3 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-4.1) (-2.6) (-4.0) (-4.1) (-4.2)
0.08
(3.8)
-7.7E-3
(-5.3)
-0.23
(-2.3)
-0.02 -0.09 -1.2E-3 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(-1.6) (-4.5) (-0.1) (-3.3) (-6.9) (-4.5) (-4.2) (-4.6)
1.1E-3 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.5) (8.1) (8.3) (9.9) (9.2) (9.2) (9.2)
0.83
(8.2)
1.43
(4.4)
2.6E-4 5.7E-4 7.0E-4 9.3E-5 5.8E-4 4.5E-4 4.3E-4 4.8E-4
(2.4) (3.3) (5.3) (0.7) (4.7) (3.6) (3.4) (3.9)
-0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(-6.1) (-7.0) (-5.1) (-5.1) (-7.0) (-6.1) (-5.2) (-6.5)
0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(2.9) (1.9) (3.8) (4.3) (2.6) (3.2) (3.2) (3.4)
3.6E-5
(0.9)
1.5E-4
(1.1)
8.0E-7
(1.4)
R2 0.60 0.58 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59
F-Value 53.6 48.4 50.7 52.4 47.8 46.6 46.7 46.8
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Table 7. Israel: Estimates of Creditworthiness (c)
and its Percentage Change over Time
Level Percent Change of c
U = 0 U = 5 U = 0 U = 5
1971 85.34 83.31
1972 91.03 97.25 6.7 2.0
1973 89.14 96.63 -2.1 -0.6
1974 84.19 94.89 -5.6 -1.8
1975 81.76 93.99 -2.9 -0.9
1976 87.63 96.11 7.2 2.3
1977 88.85 96.53 1.4 0.4
1978 92.87 97.85 4.5 1.4
1979 94.56 98.38 1.8 0.5
1980 95.89 98.79 1.4 0.4
1981 94.95 98.50 -1.0 -0.3
1982 92.89 97.85 -2.2 -0.7
1983 91.83 97.51 -1.1 -0.4
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The expected profit (EPr) from one dollar lent to a risky
borrowing country can be written as the sum of outcomes, each weighted
by its probability of occurrence in this simple model. With probability
(1- IT), the banker expects either to earn a promised interest (i) on one
dollar lent or else to lose his initial investment and the interest with
default probability IT. In case of full repayment, the interest earned
at the end of the period is discounted at the safe rate of interest
1+i
EPr = (1 - IT) (-1 + ) + ir (-1 + 0)
1 i*
The assumption of risk neutrality 1/ implies that expected profits from
risky loans must equal-thOse from nonrisky loans, which is zero by
definition. P = -1 +
1+i*
Therefore in a competitive loan market with risk neutral and (expected)
profit-maximizing lenders, normal profits (which include management
fees, etc.) are eventually driven to zero, where EPr = O or
(1A)
1 i ,
(1-n) (-1 + ) - IT = 0
1+i*
Rearranging we get
i-i* TT(X)
1-TT(X)'
where r reflects the discounted value of the interest spread. In
equilibrium, r equals the odds of default. The vector of determinants
of default probability is denoted by x. Following FJ (1977b), the
function IT is assumed to depend on x according to the logistic form,
i.e.,
K
exp(a + Z a x )
o k=l k k
(2A) TT(X) =
1 + exp(a + Z a x )
o k=l k k
This function's boundedness between zero and one for all values of x,
renders it suitable to represent a probability function. It also lends
1/ This assumption is chosen for expositional purpose only, and may
be relaxed by another assumption e.g., risk aversion. See for example
Feder and Just (1980), where it is shown that, given the small size of
each Euromarket transaction relative to the lender's assets, the risk
aversion premium is negligible relative to the variation in the spread
( i - i * ) .
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FIGURE 1
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itself easily to regression analysis, since the logarithm of equation
(6) can be written
ri-i* r T K X ) . K
(3A) In = In = a + S a x
1 + i* l-ir(jc) o k=l k k
FJ (1977b) assume, that the Euroloan-market is approximated more
accurately by monopolistic competition. Maximizing the lender's
expected utility under the assumption, that he knows the borrowing
country's demand elasticity (y = |i L. / L|) , FJ's respective
expression to our equation (8) includes also an element of the demand
elasticity and one of risk aversion in the intercept. The latter
vanishes in case of risk neutrality. Their study is on cross-sectional
data of different countries. In order to account for differing demand
elasticities in different countries they apply the variance-components
approach, which combines cross-section and time series data, (see also
Edwards (1984). Since our data differ in this respect, there is no need
to split up the elasticity term in case of a monopolistic market
structure, if this elasticity is stable over the analyzed period.
The existence of quantity constraints on loans may in some
instances impair on the inference on sovereign risk from observed
interest spreads. Such quotas may be due to different sources, namely
to self-imposed quantity constraints by lenders, sometimes referred to
as "country limits" or else to the borrowing country's capital controls
policy. Endogenously determined country limits by the lending banks are
discussed in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a), Sachs and Cohen (1982), Sachs
(1983) and others. Obviously, once a borrowing country has reached its
country limit with all the lending banks, then any shifts of the demand
curve will change the spread without altering default risk. Several
examples are illustrated in the following diagrams.
Figure l(a) demonstrates the case of lender-imposed country limits,
where the spread (ig - i*) does reflect country risk while (ii -i*) does
not, since the correct measure in both cases would be i^ - i*« 1/ In
Figure 1 (b) the alternative instruments of capital control, namely a
quota (K) or a capital import tax (t) do not affect the spread as a
signal for country risk, as long as the borrowers have not reached the
credit ceilings.
This study, therefore, implicitly assumes that the total market's
credit ceiling for Israeli loan demand has not been reached during the
observed period. This seems to be an appropriate assumption.
_l/ Notice however that even if credit ceilings are reached, changes
in the spread, generated by, say, a reduction in credit ceilings, still
remain relevant signals for changes in creditworthiness.
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Definitions of variables:
A given variable's trend growth or variance from trend is estimated
as follows:
(a) For growth rates of real GNP per capita (GRPCY) and real
exports (GEXP)
ln(y.) = a + b(t) + u^t , t = quarters over 5
years
growth of y = [(b+1)4 - 1] x 100
(b) For variances
yt = a + b (t) + Ujj. , t = quarters over 5 years.
1 2
Var (y) = I (y - y )
n-2 t t
Var (y) = VGS, VRGNP respectively, where GS = balance on goods
and services (current dollars), GNPR = Real GNP (1980 Shekels).
(c) Other definitions:
i = interest rate on the loan contract.
i* = LIBOR for loans received in the Eurodollar market or
PRIME-rate for loans received in the US-capital market.
IT = probability of default.
c = creditworthiness index. c = (1 - n) x 100.
RPCD = real per capita debt = (E/CP) x gross debt/population,
where
E = official exchange rate, CP = consumer price index.
RPCR = real per capita official reserves = (E/CP) x (official
reserves/population)
GNPPC = per capita real quarterly GNP (1980 prices)
VRGNP = Variance of quarterly real GNP from trend, estimated
over 5 years.
DGNPPC = Nominal yearly per capita GNP in dollars, translated
into dollars on a quarterly basis.
DGNPY = yearly aggregated quarterly GNP, denominated in
dollars.
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OPEN = (imports + exports of goods and services) / DGNPY.
MPK = (change in yearly nominal GNP / (yearly nominal net
investment).
MPI = 1/MPK.
KPC = capital stock per capita at 1980 prices.
CPI - annual change in the Consumer Price Index
DS1 = yearly amortization of total debt + total interest
payments.
DSR1 = DS1/DSC
where
DS = yearly amortization of long and medium term debt + total
interest payments.
DSC = Debt service capacity constrained by a downward rigidity
in aggregate consumption. For the formula, see O. Liviatan (1984, p.
810).
DSRATIO = DS / exports.
DSTRATIO = DS / (exports + unilateral transfer payments).
DTERM = (long and medium term gross debt) / total gross debt.
SUM1 = loan size in US$1,000.
GRACE = grace period of loan in number of months.
TERM = loan maturity in number of months.
EURO = Dummy variable with value = 1, if the loan was received
in the Euromarket and equal = 0, if not.
PUBLIC = Dummy variable with value equal to 1 if the loan was
received by the Government or semigovernmental agencies and firms.
Sources: The interest spread r, the loan amounts, grace periods and
maturities are from the Foreign Exchange Comptroller at the Bank of
Israel. The macroeconomic data are from the Central Bureau of
Statistics, Israel.
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Table 8. Israel: Different Assumptions on the Information-Lag
Dependent Variable: r
Number of Days
90 180 270 360
Intercept
RPCD
RPCR
OPEN
VGS
KPC
DGNPPC
DSRATIO
DTERM
CPI
PUBLIC
EURO
-0.40 -1.16 -1.36 0.82
(-1.1) (-3.0) (-3.3) (1.4)
3.7E-3 3.8E-3 0.02 2.0E-3
(1.6) (1.7) (7.3) (0.6
-0.02 -3.8E-3 -0.04 -0.02
(-2.4) (-0.4) (-4.8) (-2.0)
-0.03 0.32 0.54 0.03
(-0.3) (2.9) (6.0) (0.3)
2.9E-7 1.7E-6 1.5E-6 1.7E-6
(0.6) (3.3) (4.1) (3.9)
2.3E-3 -5.2E-3 -0.01 -5.6E-3
(0.8) (-1.5) (-4.1) (-1.7)
-0.01 0.03 -1.2E-3 -0.01
(-0.7) (1.6) (-0.08) (-0.9)
6.2E-3 0.02 0.02 8.5E-3
(2.5) (5.5) (8.3) (2.7)
0.44 1.08 1.43 -0.73
(1.7) (3.4) (4.4) (-1.6)
1.2E-5 9.4E-5 7.0E-4 3.4E-4
(0.1) (0.9) (5.3) (1.7)
-0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
(-6.6) (-5.5) (-5.1) (-7.6)
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
(2.3) (3.1) (3.8) (2.8)
R2 0.50 0.49 0.61 0.54
F-Value 31.7 30.8 50.7 37.5
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Table 9. Israel: Time Dummies
Dependent variable: In (r)
Explanatory variables:
Intercept -102.68 TREND 0.05
(-1.2) (1.2)
RPCD 0.17 D73 0.63
(6.0) (2.3)
RPCR -0.48 D76 0.15
(-4.6) (0.9)
OPEN 3.53 D80a 0.12
(4.0) (1.2)
VGS 2.4E-5
(5.5)
KPC -0.15
(-4.7)
DGNPPC -0.56
(-4.4)
DSRATIO 0.09
(5.2)
CPI 3.2E-3
(2.5)
PUBLIC -0.13
(-2.8)
EURO 0.41
(4.3)
R2 = 0.53
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